Real time analysis of euro area fiscal policies: adjustment to the crisis by Paloviita, Maritta & Kinnunen, Helvi
Maritta Paloviita – Helvi Kinnunen
Real time analysis of 
euro area fiscal policies: 
adjustment to the crisis
Bank of Finland Research
Discussion Papers
















































Bank of Finland 
PO Box 160 
FI-00101 HELSINKI 
Finland 






Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 
21 • 2011 
   Maritta Paloviita* − Helvi Kinnunen** 
   Real time analysis of 
euro area fiscal policies: 
adjustment to the crisis 
    The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. 
 
*  Email: maritta.paloviita@bof.fi. Corresponding author. 
** Email:  helvi.kinnunen@bof.fi. 
 
Thanks are due to Jouko Vilmunen and Matti Virén for useful 
comments and to Reijo Siiskonen and Tarja Yrjölä for 

























































Real time analysis of euro area fiscal policies: 
adjustment to the crisis 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 21/2011 
Maritta Paloviita – Helvi Kinnunen 




Using real time data from the OECD and fiscal policy reaction functions, this 
study explores euro area fiscal policies since the late 1990s. Both discretionary 
plans for the budget year and policy changes during budget implementation stages 
are investigated. The main focus is on the fiscal adjustment to the recent financial 
and economic crisis. The results suggest that during the monetary union (EMU) 
euro area planned fiscal policies have been long-term oriented and counter-
cyclical. In the implementation stages new policy decisions have been made as a 
response to unexpected economics developments. We provide evidence that the 
crisis had a clear impact on discretionary policies. Due to the increased 
uncertainty, the crisis emphasized the impact of cyclical developments on fiscal 
planning. In the implementation stages, huge forecast errors made in budget 
planning were observed. As a consequence, new decisions were made in order to 
alleviate negative impacts of the crisis on the euro area economies. 
 
Keywords: fiscal policy, real time data, planning stage, implementation stage, 
cyclical sensitivity, economic crisis 
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Euromaiden finanssipolitiikka reaaliaikaisen aineiston 
avulla tarkasteltuna: kriisiin sopeutuminen 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 21/2011 
Maritta Paloviita − Helvi Kinnunen 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan euromaissa harjoitettua finanssipolitiik-
kaa 1990-luvun lopulta lähtien OECD:n reaaliaikaisen aineiston ja finanssipolitii-
kan reaktiofunktioiden avulla. Tarkastelussa ovat mukana sekä päätösperäiset 
budjettisuunnitelmat että politiikkamuutokset budjetin toteutusvaiheessa. Huo-
mion kohteena on erityisesti finanssipolitiikan sopeutuminen viimeaikaiseen ra-
hoituskriisiin ja siitä seuranneeseen taloudelliseen taantumaan. Tulosten mukaan 
euromaat ovat rahaliiton (EMU) aikana sitoutuneet budjettisuunnitelmissaan pit-
kän aikavälin suunnitelmiin ja pyrkineet tasaamaan suhdanteita. Budjettien 
toteutusvaiheessa on reagoitu uusilla päätöksillä yllätyksiin talouskehityksessä. 
Tutkimus osoittaa, että kriisi muutti euromaiden päätösperäistä finanssi-
politiikkaa. Epävarmuuden kasvu korosti kriisin aikana suhdannekehityksen 
merkitystä budjettisuunnittelussa. Kun budjettien toteutusvaiheessa havaittiin 
suunnitteluvaiheessa tehdyt huomattavat ennustevirheet, uusilla päätöksillä pyrit-
tiin lieventämään kriisin negatiivisia vaikutuksia euromaiden talouksiin. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssipolitiikka, reaaliaikainen aineisto, politiikan suunnittelu ja 
toteutus, suhdanneherkkyys, taloudellinen kriisi 
 
JEL-luokittelu: E62, E32  
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During the international financial crisis and subsequent global recession, fiscal 
policies dampened the decreases in output and employment in the euro area 
countries.  Both automatic stabilizers and a wide range of discretionary policy 
measures alleviated the negative impacts of the crisis. As a result, the crisis 
severely weakened public sector finances in the euro area
1. 
 
Active use of fiscal policy to smoothen economic cycles always entails a 
significant dose of uncertainty. Fiscal measures may be ineffective and their 
macroeconomic effects can differ drastically from estimated effects, especially if 
policy makers fail to take sufficient notice of economic agents’ reactions to policy 
changes. The impact-lags of fiscal measures are also difficult to estimate. For 
example, fiscal policy is pro-cyclical if expansionary policies do not have effect 
until the economy has recovered from the slump. Errors in forecasting, however, 
pose the main risk to inappropriate policy decisions.  
 
Fiscal policy decisions are always based on information available at the time, i.e. 
real time information. Typically, real time estimates of economic developments 
are subsequently revised – often several times – before the final (revised) numbers 
are published. Therefore, the stance of fiscal policy may look quite different in the 
light of final as opposed to real time data. The recent crisis highlights the 
uncertainty in evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal policy and the importance of 
the difference between real time and final data for a balanced assessment of the 
fiscal policy stance.   
 
It is important to distinguish the budget planning stage from the budget 
implementation stage in order to get the correct perspective on discretionary fiscal 
policy. It is in the budget planning stage, where policy plans are made for the 
budget year, which determine the intended stance of fiscal policy.  Fiscal policy in 
the implementation stage refers to new policy decisions made during the budget 
year, in response to information available at the time. The use of real time 
information enables us to analyze the two fiscal stages separately. 
 
Fiscal policy studies are often based on fiscal policy reaction functions and real 
time information
2. Cimadomo (2008), for instance, analyses fiscal policy in 19 
industrial countries in 1994 – 2006. The results show that, based on final data, 
fiscal policy in OECD countries was relatively pro-cyclical, whereas it was 
                                                 
1 For more on euro area fiscal policies during the crisis, see eg van Riet (ed.) (2010).  Future 
challenges are discussed in Cimadomo (2011a). 
2 See Cimadomo (2011b) for a survey of the real time fiscal policy literature.  
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counter-cyclical from the perspective of real time data.  Pina (2009), using 
European Commission data, also shows that, based on real time data, fiscal policy 
in 15 EU countries has generally been more counter-cyclical than is suggested by 
the final data. In Beetsma et al. (2009) the budget implementation process in EU 
countries is examined using a real time data set for the years 1998 – 2007. The 
results of that study suggest that strong national fiscal institutions contribute to 
ambitious fiscal plans and effective implementation. Fiscal planning and budget 
implementation stages in the Netherlands are analyzed in Beetsma et. al. (2010). 
Using real time data over the period 1958 – 2009, that study finds evidence that 
institutional factors are important for understanding the objectives of fiscal 
planning. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) study fiscal plans and their 
implementation in OECD countries in 1995 – 2006. Using real time data they find 
that empirical identification of the fiscal planning and implementation stages is 
crucial. They provide evidence that fiscal plans have been a-cyclical in EU 
countries and counter-cyclical in other OECD countries. Moreover, in the 
implementation stage, the response of EU countries to unexpected changes in the 
output gap has been pro-cyclical. By contrast, in other OECD countries the 
response has been a-cyclical.   
 
Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated the exceptional policy 
measures implemented during the crisis. Also, the worsened fiscal positions and 
endangered long-term sustainability of public finances have been at the center of 
analytical and practical fiscal policy debate. However, the issue of how the crisis 
has affected both the planned and the implemented policies has not yet been 
examined intensively. 
 
Our study contributes to the current literature and policy debate by examining 
euro area discretionary fiscal policy in the EMU period, focusing separately on 
policy changes during the crisis. The planning and implementation stages are 
distinguished via real time panel data constructed from OECD Economic Outlook 
publications (June and December issues). Although, the final data for recent years 
have not yet been published, the currently available real time information enables 
us to investigate possible policy changes during the crisis. Both fiscal policy 
reaction functions and specifications that explain policy changes in the budget 
implementation stage are estimated using panel data for ten euro area countries.   
 
The results suggest that during the time of monetary union (EMU) euro area 
planned fiscal policies have been long-term oriented and counter-cyclical. In the 
implementation stages new policy decisions have been made in response to 
unexpected economics developments. We provide evidence that the crisis had a 
definite impact on discretionary policies. Due to the increased uncertainty, the 
crisis spotlighted the impact of cyclical developments on fiscal planning.  In the  
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implementation stages, huge forecast errors in connection with planned policy 
were observed. As a consequence, policies were significantly adjusted in order to 
alleviate the negative impacts of the crisis on euro area economies.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and analyses the 
forecast accuracy. Empirical analysis is reported in Section 3 and conclusions are 
drawn in section 4. 
 
2 Data description 
Annual real time data for the period 1997 – 2010 are constructed using OECD 
Economic Outlook publications, for June and December, issues No. 61 – 88. 
Twelve euro area countries are included in the study: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. Each of the Outlook issues includes, for each country, time series for the 
following variables: real GDP growth rate, ratio of cyclically adjusted primary 
balance to potential GDP
3, ratio of gross government debt to GDP (Maastricht 
debt), and the OECD’s production function –based estimate of the output gap
4. 
The panel data include more than a decade of real time lagged values of all the 
variables, annual real time estimates of current-year values, and real time 
forecasts for the following one or two calendar years. The final data, for our 




There are several advantages of using OECD data in real time fiscal policy 
analysis.  For example, all the series are comparable across countries, since they 
are constructed using the same methodology. Moreover, OECD forecasts contain 
policy makers’ perceptions of fiscal policy measures and economic developments, 
since national authorities contribute regularly to the OECD forecasting process. 
The December issues provide information available at times when fiscal plans are 
made. Correspondingly, the June issues reflect the real time information available 
to policy makers during budget implementation stages.  
 
Next, we look at the data and some standard summary statistics of forecast 
accuracy. We also show how real time estimates for a certain year have evolved 
                                                 
3 To estimate the discretionary component of fiscal policy, one must eliminate from the 
government financial balance the business-cycle effects and other effects that are not due to fiscal 
actions, such as changes in interest rates and the effects of prior developments in debts and 
receivables.  
4 For details of the OECD’s production-function-based methodology, see Beffy et al. (2006) and 
OECD (2009): Chapter 4 in Economic Outlook No. 85.  
5 The most recent years’ data are still subject to revision.   
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over time.  Figures 1 – 3 in Appendix 1 depict real time estimates of economic 
developments over the period 2008 – 2010. They clearly indicate that the crisis 
was deep and unexpected. In 2008 real GDP growth forecasts for the next year 
were overoptimistic for all the countries. Output gap developments reflect sharp 
decreases in aggregate activity as measured by the real GDP. Cyclically adjusted 
primary balances decreased substantially, demonstrating the exceptionally large 
fiscal stimulus applied during the crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 provides summary information on the average accuracy of December 
forecasts. We compare real time estimates of current-year outcomes with 
previous-year forecasts of those outcomes. Three different periods are compared: 
1998 – 2010 (the whole sample), 1998 – 2007 (pre-crisis period) and 2008 – 2010 
(crisis period). As shown in Table 1, forecasts were not very accurate during the 
recession years; both the Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) and Root Mean Squared 
Errors (RMSE) were twice as large as in previous years and the debts were 
systematically underestimated. One might well surmise that the exceptionally 
large forecast errors have had an impact on fiscal policies in the crisis years. 
 
Figures in Appendix 2 show illustratively how the assessments of economic 
developments in the year 2009 changed in the course of time.  Until the end of 
2008, in most of the countries the primary balance in 2009 was projected to 
remain in surplus. In June 2009 the estimates were revised downwards 
substantially and many of them became negative. For Belgium and Greece, the 
biggest downward revisions were not made until around the end of 2009. Only for 
Italy did the primary balance estimates for year 2009 remain roughly unchanged 
over time. The output gap estimates and real GDP growth estimates were also 
revised downwards sharply in mid-2009. After that, cyclical variables were 
typically revised slightly upwards. Only for Finland, were the estimates for output 
gap and real GDP growth substantially revised further downwards after summer 
2009. Overall, the figures clearly show that the crisis hit the euro area countries at 
the same time (in mid-2009). It is clear that the recession was unexpected and 
deep.   
 
3 Empirical analysis 
In this section we analyse euro area discretionary fiscal policies in the EMU 
period using simple regressions and the panel data described above. Planned fiscal 
policies and policy changes in the budget implementation stages are examined 
separately. Special attention is paid to policy inertia and cyclical sensitivity of  
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policy decisions. In addition, the impacts of the recent crisis on euro area fiscal 
policies are examined in more detail. Greece and Ireland are excluded from the 
regression analysis, because due to exceptional developments the observations for 
these countries qualify as outliers. Consequently, including them could distort the 
analysis of average euro area policies. 
 
3.1 Planned fiscal policies 
Fiscal policy plans for the next year are generally made after summer. By the end 
of the year, fiscal authorities approve the budget for the next year. Since planned 
policies are always decided on the basis of information available at the time, it is 
natural to use December information from the OECD Economic Outlook 
publications for analysing planned policies. 
 
The fiscal policy reaction function indicates, depending on the exact specification, 
how the fiscal authority responds to the current or forecasted state of the economy 
as well as how persistent the planned policies are. Consequently, a fiscal policy 
reaction function can be used to assess whether fiscal policy is systematically pro- 
or counter-cyclical. Using real time analysis, we examine how euro area planned 
policies (the primary focus of policy makers) have responded to expected cyclical 
conditions in the budget year. Thus, we make use of forward looking reaction 
functions. Discretionary fiscal actions are measured by the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB), ie the difference between tax revenues and 









1 t GAP CAPB c CAPB ε + β + α + = + +  (1) 
 
In equation (1) the variable 
t
1 t CAPB +  reflects policy actions planned at time t for 
the next period, and the term 
t
1 t GAP +  is a real time (period t) estimate of the 
output gap in period t+1. The variable 
t
t CAPB , is a real time estimate of the 




If fiscal policy is counter-cyclical, taxes are raised or expenditures reduced when 
the output gap is positive and vice versa when the output gap is negative. Thus, 
                                                 
6 Other factors influencing fiscal policy plans can be taken into account by adding variables to the 
reaction function. The ratio of gross debt to GDP, the government deficit or variables related to 
demographics are typical additional variables in reaction functions (see, for example, Beetsma and 
Giuliodori 2010).  
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the coefficient β is positive. The policy inertia variable indicates the degree to 
which policy design emphasizes long term goals: the larger the estimated 
coefficient, the greater the long-term orientation. A high degree of persistence in 
fiscal policy means that the fiscal actions of a given period also limit the options 
for future fiscal actions, so that there is less leeway for discretionary measures
7. 
Because potential GDP and the output gap measures are subject to considerable 
uncertainty, we use real GDP growth as an alternative measure of cyclical 
conditions. In order to conduct a robustness analysis of the forward-lookingness 
of budget planning, we also estimate the reaction functions, which are based on 
real time current-year estimates of the output gap or real GDP growth.  
 
There are differences in the conduct of fiscal policy across the countries. For 
example, the political cycle may impact each country’s policy decisions: typically, 
the pressure for fiscal easing increases before elections. The institutional setup for 
fiscal policy also affects the policy responses: the tighter the politicians’ hands are 
tied, the more inert the discretionary policy and the less the leeway in policy 
planning. In panel estimations cross-country differences are taken into account by 
using the country-specific constants (cross section fixed effects).   
 
In the forward looking equation (1) fiscal policy plans and the expected cyclical 
situation may be correlated. Thus, there might be feedback effects from planned 
policy to the output gap (or real GDP growth). Possible simultaneity problems are 
taken into account in the estimations by employing instrumental variables. Our 
empirical analysis is based on the panel two-stage least squares method. When 
equation (1) is based on current-year estimates of cyclical conditions, ordinary 
least squares method (OLS) is used. 
 
First, we examine whether planned fiscal policies in the euro area countries have 
been historically pro- or counter-cyclical and how plan-determined (persistent) 
their policies have been. We then analyze the effects of the recent crisis on fiscal-
policy plans. In order to distinguish between the crisis period and the pre-crisis 
period, we add a dummy variable to the reaction function. The CRISIS dummy is 
equal to zero in 1999 - 2008 and equal to one in 2008 - 2010
8. We investigate, 
whether the effect of cyclical conditions on policy plans changes during the crisis 
                                                 
7 Afonso et. al. (2010) find a negative correlation between degrees of discretionary leeway and 
persistence, which supports this view.  
8 Galí and Perotti (2003) estimate a similar equation based on a dummy variable in order to 
examine the significance of the Maastricht Treaty for fiscal policy.  Dummy variables are also 
used by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010). In that study OECD countries are divided into EU 
members and other countries in an analysis of fiscal policy. Staerh (2008) divides his real time 
data set into Central and Eastern European countries and examines the cycle-sensitivity of fiscal 
policy. Candelon et. al. (2010) use similar approach in studying the stability of fiscal rules for 
EMU countries before and after the Maastricht Treaty.   
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and whether the crisis had an impact on policy inertia.  We use the Wald test of 
coefficient restrictions in order to determine, whether the impact of the crisis on 
planned policies was statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Results for equation (1) are reported in table 2, and the corresponding Wald test 
results are summarized in table 3. The IV-columns give results for the forward 
looking models and OLS-columns display the corresponding results for the 
models without forward looking variables. The instruments for the output gap –
based IV-equation are the real time current and lagged estimates of real GDP 
growth. Correspondingly, in the model with real GDP growth, the instruments are 
real time current and lagged estimates of the output gap. In both cases real time 
current and lagged estimates of the central government debt-to-GDP ratio are also 
included in the instrument set.  
 
Overall, the results in table 2 without the crisis dummy indicate that the reaction 
function provides a reasonable representation of planned fiscal policy in the euro-
area countries. The explanatory power of the reaction function is quite high, and 
the estimated coefficients have the correct signs and reasonable magnitudes. All 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level in the forward 
looking models. Among the OLS results, only the estimated output-gap 
coefficient is not significant at the 5% level.  
 
The crisis seems to have affected euro area planned policies. When the crisis 
dummy is used in equation (1) to separate the two periods, we obtain evidence 
that the cyclical sensitivity of fiscal plans increased during the crisis (we obtain 
higher coefficient estimates of the cyclical variable for the crisis years than for the 
earlier years). Both the expected output gap and the current real GDP growth are 
statistically significant only in the crisis period, which is reasonable. During the 
crisis, it was very challenging for policy makers to assess future cyclical 
conditions in the planning stage. In order to avoid policy mistakes, also real time 
current GDP growth estimates were taken into account in fiscal planning. Policy 
inertia seems to have decreased only slightly during the recession (in three of four 
cases). In spite of some policy changes reported in table 2, the impact of the crisis 
on euro area fiscal policies was however quite limited. According to the Wald test 
the estimated coefficients for the two periods are not statistically different in most 
of the cases in table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Overall, the estimation results reported above suggest that in the EMU period euro 
area planned fiscal policies have generally been quite long-term oriented 
(persistency coefficient varies between 0.6 – 0.8). In addition, the real time views 
of cyclical conditions have impacted the fiscal plans. The cyclical situation 
coefficients are larger in the forward looking models than where the current-
year’s variables are used. This is reasonable, since it is obvious that actual fiscal 
planning is forward looking. The crisis seems to have altered the effect of cyclical 
conditions on fiscal planning. 
 
3.2 Fiscal policy adjustment in the implementation stage 
Next, we analyze how euro area fiscal policies reacted to new information during 
the budget year. More precisely, we investigate policy makers’ reassessments of 
economic conditions in the course of the budget year. Using real time information 
we are able to capture the economic situation confronting policy makers when 
previously planned policy measures are implemented. If the fiscal situation or 
cyclical conditions have changed substantially from the view prevailing when 
fiscal plans were made, fiscal policy is adjusted (i.e. new decisions are made). In 
the analysis of policy changes in the implementation stage, we use both June and 
December information from the OECD Economic Outlook publications.  
 





1 t , t
t
− − − =  is the difference between the real time 
current-year estimate of the primary balance and the corresponding last-year 
forecast. Correspondingly, we define the variable 










− − =  as the difference between the real time view of 
last year’s primary balance and the real time estimate of the current-year primary 
balance, as assessed last year.  We also measure revision of the cyclical situation 





1 t , tj
t GAP GAP GAP
− − − = , ie the 
difference between a real time mid-year estimate of the current year output gap 
and the corresponding expected output gap at the time of fiscal planning. The 
mid-year real time estimate 
tj
t GAP  is based on June information from the OECD.  
We follow Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) and estimate the regression 
 
t




1 t , t
1 t
1 t , t
t GAP CAPB CAPB c CAPB μ + θ + ρ + ϕ + =
− − −
−
−  (2) 
 
In equation (2) the adjustment to discretionary policy during the budget year is 
explained by the three factors which relate real time information at the time of 
fiscal planning to real time information at the time of budget implementation. 
During the implementation stage, fiscal policy is adjusted to new information 
related to the previous year’s primary balance, last year’s fiscal plans and new  
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information on cyclical conditions. The term 
1 t
t CAPB
−  refers to the budget 
process effect on fiscal adjustment. The budget planning stage and 
implementation stage are closely linked, since it is clear that large forecast errors 
in the planning state increase the need to adjust policy in the course of the budget 
year.  
 
Equation (2) obviates potential endogeneity problems, since we use real time mid-
year estimates of the output gap. It is reasonable to assume that it takes at least a 
half year before the error in the fiscal stance has an impact on the output gap. 
Therefore, equation (2) can be estimated using OLS method.  Again, the 
estimations include country-specific constants and two alternative measures of 
cyclical conditions.  The EMU period estimation results, with and without the 
crisis dummy, are reported in table 4. The corresponding Wald test results are 
shown in table 5. First we investigate the primary balance effects and cyclical 




[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The primary balance effects are reported in section A of table 4. The results 
indicate that when assessing the EMU period without separating the crisis period, 
only the base effect is important for fiscal adjustment in the implementation stage. 
The non-significant effect of the budget process may be related to stable fiscal 
policy frameworks in the euro area countries. (In the case of the budget process 
effect, the estimated coefficient and R
2 are very low.) When the crisis years and 
previous years are examined separately, the R
2 values are higher and the estimated 
coefficients are higher for the crisis period compared to the earlier years. 
Interestingly, the budget process effect is significant in the crisis period. This may 
reflect the huge forecast errors of primary balances observed in 2008 – 2010. It is 
worth noting that the budgetary process is significantly estimated only for the 
crisis period with a negative sign. It indicates that planned budget surpluses tend 
to be followed by downward revisions in the implementation stage.  As reported 
in table 5, the Wald test suggests that the change in fiscal adjustments due to the 
base effects and the budget process effects were statistically significant during the 
crisis period. 
 
                                                 
9 In order to take into account potential serial correlation in the error terms, the lagged dependent 
variable was also included in the original regressions. Since this term was not statistically 
significant, it was not included in the results reported here.   
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Next, we consider whether the revised view of the cyclical situation has affected 
fiscal adjustment (see section B in table 4). The estimation results for the whole 
EMU period (incl. the crisis period) suggest that fiscal plans have been adjusted in 
response to new information on both cyclical variables. When the specification is 
based on real GDP growth (instead of the output gap), both the estimated 
coefficient and the explanatory power of the equation are higher. However, when 
the model is estimated over the two subsamples corresponding to the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods using the crisis dummy, we obtain evidence that the output gap 
contributed significantly to policy change only during the crisis. Only in the case 
of the output gap, does the Wald test suggest that fiscal policy adjustment changed 
significantly during the crisis. This confirms the results obtained in the analysis of 
planned policies in the previous section: the importance of the output gap for 
discretionary policy decisions increased during the crisis.  
 
Measured by the estimated total effect of the three factors analyzed above (see 
section B in table 4), we conclude that the model is able to capture quite well the 
changes of policy during the budget year.  The crisis emphasized the role of both 
the output gap and the budget process on fiscal adjustment. According to the Wald 
test, the change in fiscal policy adjustment was significant in the crisis years (see 
table 5).  
 
All in all, the empirical analysis presented above indicates that during the 
monetary union (EMU) euro area planned fiscal policies have been long-term 
oriented and counter-cyclical. In the implementation stages fiscal plans have been 
adjusted in response to unexpected macroeconomic developments. We provide 
evidence that the crisis had a clear impact on discretionary policies. The impact of 
the cyclical situation on fiscal planning increased due to heightened uncertainty.  
In the implementation stages huge realized forecast errors relative to information 
available at the time of budget planning stage were observed. As a consequence, 
policies were adjusted substantially in the implementation stage in order to 
alleviate the negative effects of the crisis on euro area economies. The results 
reflect increased uncertainty and huge forecast errors during the recession. The 
crisis was unexpected and deep. During the crisis years, fiscal plans were adjusted 
in the course of the budget year more extensively than in the pre-crisis years. 
Especially in June 2009, the real time assessments of economic conditions were 
totally different than a half year earlier (see appendix 2).   
 
It is worth noting that the crisis seems to have emphasized the importance of the 
output gap as a measure of cyclical conditions for fiscal policy purposes. This is 
reasonable, since during a deep recession real GDP growth and the output gap can 
give very different pictures of the cyclical situation. For instance, looking at GDP 
growth, one may see the recession as a collapse in a single year whereas the  
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output gap may indicate a long-lasting downswing (as long as output remains 
below potential). Unlike the output gap, the growth of real GDP does not point to 
a long-term collapse of economic activity in the crisis years.  Therefore, real GDP 
growth did not provide a very revealing picture of economic performance for 
fiscal policy purposes. Instead, the output gap more clearly reflected the economic 
dip caused by the recession. The level of output remained below potential for 
several years (see figures 2 and 3 in appendix).  
 
4 Concluding remarks 
This paper examines discretionary fiscal policies in the euro area countries since 
the late 1990s. Both fiscal plans for budget years and policy changes during the 
budget implementation stages are investigated using real time data constructed 
from the June and December issues of the OECD’s Economic Outlook. The main 
focus of the study is on fiscal adjustment to the recent financial and economic 
crisis. Greece and Ireland are excluded from the analysis, since exceptional 
developments in these countries would have distorted the results.   
 
The results indicate that during the crisis forecast errors and statistical revisions in 
the euro area countries were considerably larger than before. Although the global 
recession hit all the euro countries at the same time, the cross-country differences 
in forecast errors and statistical revisions were significant. Conditions in the crisis 
countries were notably different than in the other countries.  
 
The results suggest that during the time of monetary union (EMU) euro area 
planned fiscal policies have been long-term oriented and counter-cyclical. 
Moreover, in the implementation stages new policy decisions have been made in 
response to unexpected economic developments. The crisis changed the 
discretionary policies in the euro area. More attention was paid to cyclical 
developments in fiscal planning.  In the implementation stages, policies were 
adjusted significantly on the basis of real time information.  
 
Fiscal adjustment after the budget planning stage may have negative effects on the 
economy. Economic agents form their expectations on the basis of fiscal plans. If, 
however, plans are notably adjusted in the implementation stage, it might be 
costly for economic agents to change their behaviour accordingly. All in all, the 
results indicate that during the deep recession, when economic uncertainty was 
widespread and monetary policy was accommodative and partly based on non-
standard policy measures, fiscal policies were adjusted considerably in order to 
alleviate the negative impacts of the crisis on euro area economies.   
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Tables 




ME MAE  RMSE
Cyclically adjusted primary balance, % of potential GDP -0.39 1.11  1.61 
Ratio of gross government debt to GDP 0.79 3.24  4.39 
Output gap, % of potential GDP -0.05 0.81  1.12 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.44 1.18  1.57 
1998–2007 
ME MAE  RMSE
Cyclically adjusted primary balance, % of potential GDP 0.06 0.81  1.00 
Ratio of gross government debt to GDP -0.34 2.48  3.04 
Output gap, % of potential GDP 0.08 0.67  0.83 
Real GDP growth, %  -0.14 0.90  1.10 
2008–2010 
ME MAE  RMSE
Cyclically adjusted primary balance, % of potential GDP -1.71 2.05  2.63 
Ratio of gross government debt to GDP 4.57 5.75  6.98 
Output gap, % of potential GDP -0.54 1.31  1.65 
Real GDP growth, %  -1.46 2.10  2.53 
ME = mean error, MAE = mean average error, RMSE = root mean squared error  
19 





  EMU period  Before and during
the crisis 





    
Crisis*GAPt+1   0.199*
(0.073) 
  
(1-Crisis)*GAPt+1   0.121 
(0.082) 
  
GAPt     0.044 
(0.038) 
 
Crisis*GAPt      0.069 
(0.044) 
































real GDP growth 
IV OLS 
  EMU period  Before and during
the crisis 





    
Crisis*GDPt+1   0.269
(0.174) 
  
(1-Crisis)*GDPt+1   0.137 
(0.116) 
  
GDPt     0.132* 
(0.029) 
 
Crisis*GDPt      0.197* 
(0.036) 































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * refers to significance at 5 % level.  
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Table 3.   Wald test results for the planning stage 
 
Null Hypothesis  Output gap  Real GDP growth 
Forward looking reaction function     
No change in cyclical response  F = 0.802 (0.373)  F = 0.594 (0.443) 
No change in policy persistence  F = 0.255 (0.615)  F = 0.006 (0.939) 
No change in planned policy  F = 0.528 (0.591)  F = 0.302 (0.740) 
Reaction function based on current 
economic conditions  
  
No change in cyclical response  F = 0.996 (0.321)  F = 7.833 (0.006) 
No change in policy persistence  F = 0.959 (0.330)  F = 2.565 (0.112) 
No change in planned policy  F = 1.013 (0.367)  F = 4.434 (0.014) 




Table 4.   Estimates for euro area fiscal policies in the implementation stage 
Dependent variable: 
1 t , t
t , i CAPB
−  
 
Section A: Primary balance effects. 
  Base effect  Budget process 




  0.949* 
(0.118) 
   
1 t , t
1 t CAPB CRISIS
−




1 t , t
1 t CAPB ) CRISIS 1 (
−












− ×  
   -0.346* 
(0.108) 
1 t
t CAPB ) CRISIS 1 (
− × −  























Section B: Cyclical and total effects. 
  Output gap  Real GDP growth 













  0.901* 
(0.100) 
   0.716* 
(0.095) 
 
1 t , t
1 t CAPB CRISIS
−
− ×  
   1.267* 
(0.159) 
   1.014* 
(0.161) 
1 t , t
1 t CAPB ) CRISIS 1 (
−
− × −  
   0.751* 
(0.107) 
   0.684* 
(0.108) 







     
1 t , tj
t GAP CRISIS
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t GAP ) CRISIS 1 (





    
1 t , tj
t GDP
−  
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t GDP CRISIS
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t GDP ) CRISIS 1 (
− × −  















− ×  
   -
0.318* 
(0.075) 




t CAPB ) CRISIS 1 (
− × −  
   -0.105 
(0.054) 


































Table 5.   Wald test results for the implementation stage 
 
Null Hypothesis   
No change in base effect  F = 4.035 (0.047) 
No change in budget process effect  F = 14.428 (0.000) 
No change in cyclical effect 
output gap – based regression 
real GDP growth –based regression 
 
F = 7.552 (0.007) 
F = 1.314 (0.254) 
No change in total effects  
output gap –based regression 
real GDP growth –based regression 
 
F = 8.976 (0.000) 
F = 4.924 (0.003) 
p values in parentheses. APPENDIX 1.  Real time estimates for cyclically adjusted primary balances, output gaps and 
real GDP growths 
 
Figure 1.  Real time estimates of cyclically adjusted primary balances (made in December 
2008, December 2009 and December 2010) 
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1Figure 2.   Real time estimates of the output gaps (made in December 2008, December 2009 
and December 2010) 
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1Figure 3.   Real time estimates of real GDP growths (made in December 2008, December 2009 
and December 2010) 
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Appendix 2   
Real time assessments for year 2009 
 





















D2007 J2008 D2008 J2009 D2009 J2010 D2010




















D2007 J2008 D2008 J2009 D2009 J2010 D2010




















D2007 J2008 D2008 J2009 D2009 J2010 D2010
 
Note: The first three observations are forecasts made in the end of 2007 (D2007) mid-2008 
(J2008) and in the end of 2008 (D2008). Real time current-year estimates were 
published in June 2009 (J2009) and December 2009 (D2009). The last two observations 
are data revisions, made in June 2010 (J2010) and December 2010 (D2010). 
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Appendix 2.   Real time assessments for year 2009 (cont.) 
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Note: The first three observations are forecasts made in the end of 2007 (D2007) mid-2008 
(J2008) and in the end of 2008 (D2008). Real time current-year estimates were published in June 
2009 (J2009) and December 2009 (D2009). The last two observations are data revisions, made in 
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